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Recent international economic problems call for new and
imaginative mechanisms for interstate relations. The ascent in
the post-World War II era of positivist forces for cooperative
uses of international law, as contradistinguished from the in-
ternational law of coexistence in which law was employed
mostly as a sanction, leads to increasing-use of the public inter-
national corporate device.' The corporate mechanism empha-
sizes the functional approach in international law. By perceiv-
ing the diverse and quickly fluctuating character of interna-
tional society, the functional approach mandates many kinds
of legal and institutional patterns.' The late Professor Wolf-
gang Friedmann, the eminent spokesman of both the positive
and functional schools, described the new types of transna-
tional law and the growing roles of the public international
corporation.3
In today's world both theoreticians and international pol-
itical leaders are urging a rearrangement of the international
system in order to accomplish a more equitable distribution of
the world's resources, thereby reducing world tension.4 In the
interim period, the coalescence of functionalism and regional-
ism represents a trend for overcoming the antiquated statist
* B.A., 1969, J.D., 1972, LL.M., 1973, George Washington University; Diploma,
1975, University of Stockholm; Diploma, 1976, Free University, Brussels; attorney,
Nordic Law Consultants, Brussels.
1. Friedmann, Droit de Coexistence et Droit de Cooperation: Quelques Observa-
tions sur la Structure Changeant du Droit International, 6 REVUE BELGE DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 9 (1970); see also McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A
Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137 (1953); and J. BEGUIN, LES EN-
TERPRISES CONJOINTES INTERNATIONALES DANS LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT 249
(1972).
2. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-77 (1964).
3. Id. at 230.
4. Friedmann, Governmental (Public) Enterprise, XIII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 24-27 (1972); Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Com-
parative Analysis, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 333-36 (W.
Friedmann & J. Garner eds. 1970); and W. FRIEDMANN, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
passim (1954).
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system.5 International lawyers can help governments become
leaders in directing their authority in positive ways, rather
than in divergent and competitive directions. In addition, the
proper formation of transnational sources of power, which can
become important actors themselves, aids the transformation
of the international order. This article describes the role of the
public international corporation as a valuable and creative
mechanism for achieving positive cooperation between interna-
tional actors to attain a more equitable distribution of the
world's resources.
The public international corporation offers an excellent
tool for solving three related problems in international econom-
ics and politics: (1) the problem of regional interstate develop-
ment and economic integration; (2) the problem of distribution
of aid to developing countries; and most importantly, (3) the
reduction of tension in the relations between multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) and host developing countries. The use of
the corporate mechanism to accomplish these objectives has
been proposed by Professor Zacharias Sundstr6m.1 In addition
to extending and updating these ideas, this article discusses
new areas of application in commercial endeavors and the evo-
lution of the multinational corporation.
Some brief remarks on the current roles of states in the
international economy are important background for this anal-
ysis. Nation-state governments have increasingly intervened in
both the public and private sectors of the national economy as
well as the international economy in an attempt to further
national interests.7 The growing government role in the na-
tional economy can be seen partly as a function of the increas-
ingly strong element of public law in international trade and
the degree to which domestic economies interact and depend
upon world trade.' These trends combine with ideological fac-
5. R. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS 189-90 (1975).
6. See generally, Sundstrom, The Legal Procedures and Techniques of Economic
Co-operation, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L. 229-43 (1972). Since several of Professor Sundstrom's
works are cited, to avoid confusion, abbreviated footnote form will be utilized.
7. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 341-61.
8. Sundstrom, Comparative Law in the Development of the Law of International
Corporations, XIV ACTA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS JURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAR 238-39
(1972); J. BEHRMAN, CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS ON THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: PO-




tors to remove many elements of economic life from private
hands to the public sector, often by means of public corpora-
tions.' Similarly, international trade has become inextricably
connected with government policy (tariffs, customs, regional
trade arrangements, and bilateral agreements)." The evolution
of "international transactional law" has blurred distinctions
between public and private international law." The use of the
public international corporation reflects both the new trends in
trade law and the changing character of international law.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Before setting forth examples of current uses of and projec-
tions for the public international corporation, some basic defi-
nitions of the concept, and its unique organizational structures
and advantages serve as background.
The public international corporation is best defined as an
organism with a particular function, subject to an international
or community regime, possessing autonomous powers and de-
vices, and designed either to make disbursements to individu-
als or to regulate their use of the public domain under state or
interstate control. 2 Presently, various public international cor-
porate organisms exist. They usually have as a common de-
nominator an international agreement, which often also con-
tains the fundamental legal regime of the corporation. 3
Since the public international corporation embraces many
distinct types, the term can be best understood as only a ge-
neric concept. On the one hand, certain public international
9. Sundstrom, Comparative Law in the Development of the Law of International
Corporations, XIV ACTA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS JURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAE 238-39
(1972); Ghai, Current Problems of Economic Integration among Developing Countries,
UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/B/436 (1973).
10. Bergstedt, supra note 8, at 135.
11. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 221-31.
12. 1 H. ADAM, LES ORGANISMES INTERNATIONAUX SPECIALISES 9-35 (1965).
13. Examples of various types include: the Inter-American Development Bank,
the International Finance Corporation, the International Moselle Company, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank, Air Afrique, the European Company for the Financing of
Railway Equipment (EUROFIRMA), the Central African Power Corporation, and the
Interim Telecommunications Satellite Committee (INTELSAT). Z. SUNDSTROM, PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL UTILITY CORPORATIONS: CASE STUDIES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTIONS IN CORPORATE FORM 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES]. Also, for examples from an earlier work, see C. FLIGLER, THE MULTINATIONAL
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE passim (1967).
14. H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 34. Professor Louis Sohn in his description of
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corporations have close structural similarities to the domestic
public corporation, for example where one constituent state
occupies a dominant position in the corporate relationship, and
can thus impose its own will."1 On the other hand, public inter-
national corporations exist which functionally emulate an in-
ternational organization, with a high degree of member auton-
omy and limited independent decision-making power in the
organization itself."
Since the types, objectives and scope of activities of a pub-
lic international corporation vary widely, the best classification
criterion is derived from a functional test based on the original
purposes of the corporation, the scope of its activities, and the
resulting structure. 7 Using this test, five types of public inter-
national corporations have been distinguished:
1. the public international utility corporation;
2. the public international commercial corporation;
3. the public international financing corporation;
4. the public international development corporation;
5. the public international research and training center.
Some public international enterprises possess, of course, ele-
ments of more than one type. 8
The procedures for decision-making that different types of
international organizations possess indicate an interaction be-
tween the objectives of the organization and the powers ac-
African organizations does not classify river basin organizations as public international
corporations although he discusses the difficulty of distinguishing between technical
categories. Sohn, The Organization of Economic Co-operation in Africa, 16 J. OF AFRI-
CAN L. 215-16 (1972). The emphasis of this work is on the concept of the public interna-
tional corporation as it relates to its functional and positive roles in international law.
Many authorities would probably disagree on the technical terminology.
15. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 9. The best example of the
public international corporation of this type is the Basel-Mulhouse Airport in which
France has the dominant role. See the text in 2 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 223; see
also Z. SUNDSTROM, THE PUBuC INTERNATIONAL UTILITY CORPORATION: CORPORATE LAW
AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 216 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY]; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC
CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 84 et seq.
16. The Central African Power Corporation and the Scandanavian Airlines Sys-
tem are the best examples. They are described in SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 63 et seq., and 100 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 13, at 177 et seq., and 275 et seq.
17. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 9; Glaser, A Functional
Approach to the International Finance Corporation, 57 COL. L. REV. 1089 (1957).
18. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 9.
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corded to it.'" A distinction must be made between the two
elements which together gauge the functional ability of an in-
ternational organization. In order to act decisively, an organi-
zation needs adequate constitutional powers and independence
from the special interests of its members. 0
The public international corporation has two chief advan-
tages. First, its decision-making capabilities are more efficient
than those of its counterpart, the traditional international or-
ganization. Unlike the structure of the traditional type of inter-
national organization in which most powers of decision are
vested in the assembly with little in the secretariat, the public
international corporation acts through its executive, and thus
has a personality distinct from the individuality of its share-
holders.2' It also has autonomy in financial and other essential
decision-making. 22 Hence, a strong and independent executive
can save an organization which would otherwise collapse dur-
ing political crises. This will be illustrated below. 23 Secondly,
the integration effects of the public international corporation
offer benefits which its counterparts, the MNC and the state
enterprise, cannot provide.
24
Before considering applications of the public international
corporation, reference is made to numerous legal issues per-
taining to this mechanism. They include their connection to
public international organizations,2 5 the trend toward an inter-
national regime of the public international corporation,"8 their
formation, 7 composition," decision-making,2 privileges and
immunities, 0 conflict-solving mechanisms, 31 and residuary
19. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 231. See also 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at
83-85, 152-74.
20. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 231.
21. 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 27-34.
22. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AF~icAN L., at 233-35; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 50-54.
23. Id. at 56-80, 345-48.
24. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 236.
25. 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 83-87.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 104-31; SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 348-
51.
28. 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 132-37.
29. Id. at 138-51.
30. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 369-71.
31. See case examples in id. at 137-3o, 166-69, 206-07, 236-38, 302-03, 332-34.
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law.3" All these and other legal issues are important, but be-
yond the scope of this article.
III. INTEGRATION PROBLEMS AMONG DEVELOPING STATES AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Traditional regional interstate integration schemes have,
especially in developing countries, failed to attain their objec-
tives. Although several factors can be cited as causes, the lack
of proper institutional structures and the failure of govern-
ments to surrender sovereignty to intergovernmental organs
have prevented the establishment and efficient functioning of
organizations capable of achieving regional integration.3 The
public international corporation, however, has demonstrated
that it can be effectively used as a complement or alternative
to integration schemes. This section highlights organizational
problems in regional integration schemes among developing
countries and the solutions offered by the public international
corporation.
An overview of the major regional integration schemes of
developing countries illustrates some common trends. Recent
examples of integration schemes are:
1. the East African Economic Community (EAEC)-Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania;
2. the Central African Customs and Economic Union
(UDEAC)-Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Cameroon and the Cen-
tral African Republic (Chad left the Union in 1968);
3. the Maghreb Common Market (Maghreb)-Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco and Libya;
4. the Central American Common Market (CACM)-Guate-
mala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica;
5. the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA)-all the South
American republics plus Mexico;
6. the Andean Group-Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Equador, Peru
and Venezuela;
7. the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARI-
COM)-Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago;
8. the West African Economic Community (CEAC)-Dahomey,
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta;
32. Id. at 268-70, and especially the peculiar case of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway
Co., which uses a draft code, id. at 142-44.
33. Stoutjesdijk, LDC Regional Markets: Do They Work?, 5 COL. J. OF WORLD
Bus. 53 (1970); Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 229. Also, for historical background
regarding African balkanization, see H. GREEN & A. SEIDMAN, UNITY OR POVERTY? THE
ECONOMICS OF PAN-AFRICANISM 11-17, 33-37 (1968).
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9. the Economic Community of West African States (ECO-
WAS)-Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta.'
The above schemes have similar basic institutional struc-
tures. The policy-making authority consists of either the Heads
of State or Ministers with an executive committee preparing
the recommendations approved by the authority. The commit-
tee is usually assisted by a varying number of commissions and
subcommissions as well as by a secretary general with a perma-
nent secretariat. In no case, however, have the cooperating
countries been prepared to delegate any meaningful decision-
making power to a supranational authority. This factor and the
lack of sufficiently qualified personnel to prepare good regional
studies have generally hampered progress toward a regionally
integrated economy. Capital, technical skills and managerial
ability also pose important constraints on economic growth.35
The corporate device now enhances integration possibilities
within and, in some cases, between these regional groups.
The emergence of the public international corporation, in
which executive decision-making is a normal, indispensable
aspect, has introduced increased autonomy and a corporate-
type, executive decision-making into interstate relations.3 The
combination of efficient decision-making and the insulation of
the organisms from political decision-making within regional
integration schemes provides a firm solidarity and prevents
disintegration over national political issues.37 In this respect
the public international corporation has provided an important
contribution to regional integration schemes. Two areas of ac-
tivity are particularly amenable to the public international cor-
poration framework: financial-development activities and
basic infrastructure activities, such as transport and communi-
cations.
34. For a more complete listing, see Sidjanski, Current Problems of Economic
Integration-The Role of Institutions in Regional Integration among Developing
Countries, UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/B/H22 (1974). The individual texts may be ob-
tained by consulting the U.N. Treaty Series, International Legal Materials or the
Secretariat of these organizations.
35. Stoutjesdijk, supra note 33, at 5.
36. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 231.
37. Id. at 233; SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 29.
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Most integration schemes have. established an integration
bank (the European Investment Bank and European Develop-
ment Bank in the EEC, 8 the Bank for Economic Integration
in the CACM),39 a development bank (the East African Devel-
opment Bank in the EACI° and the Caribbean Development
Bank in CARICOM), 4 or a development corporation (the An-
dean Development Corporation (ADC) in the Andean Group) .4
These are constituted within the public international corpora-
tion framework, and are created to stimulate new regional eco-
nomic activities and to correct certain existing imbalances.
The autonomy of these organisms facilitates participation by
states which are otherwise not members of the scheme, such as
Venezuela's initial participation in the Development Corpora-
tion,43 and Colombia's and Venezuela's participation in the
Caribbean Development Bank." The advantages of autonomy
for these financial institutions was recently demonstrated in
the case of the CACM, in which the Monetary Council, the
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), and the Clearing
House are examples of public international corporations. These
institutions continued to function normally during, and since,
the 1969 "soccer war" crisis, which caused the closing of the
frontier between El Salvador and Honduras, impeding the flow
of goods between the two countries. 5
The use of the public international corporation for com-
mon services represents the second main area of use for this
framework. In the EAC, in addition to the numerous special-
ized institutions and organs (i.e., centers for industrial, agron-
omic, forestry, fishery and meteorological research), other im-
portant activities in the Community are performed by the four
38. Treaty of Rome, art. 129 and Protocol No. 1 annexed to the Act of Accession,
modified by art. 35 of the Adaptation Decision for the European Investment Bank; and
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (1973).
39. Sidjanski, supra note 34, at 65; Avery & Cochrane, Subregional Integration
in Latin America, the Andean Common Market, 1972 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 98.
40. Treaty for East African Cooperation, art. 21 and Charter of the East African
Development Bank, annex VI to the Treaty.
41. Uchegbu, The Caribbean Development Bank: Implications for Integration, 7
J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 568 (1973), and text in DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN THE CARIBBEAN 412-17 (R. Preiswerk ed. 1970).
42. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 98.
43. Id. at 98-100.
44. Uchegbu, supra note 41, at 575-77.
45. Sidjanski, supra note 34, at 166.
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major corporations for railways, aviation, ports, and post and
telegraphs. 6 These organisms have helped to offset the eco-
nomic and commercial advantages enjoyed by Kenya, and to
insulate the integration activities from the political and ideo-
logical problems and, more recently, financial difficulties.47
Similarly, in the CACM, the specialized autonomous organs
within the public international corporation framework, such as
the Central American Institute of Public Administration
(ICAP), the Central American Institute of Industrial Research
and Technology (ICAITI), and the Central American Air Serv-
ices Corporation (COCESNA), have continued to function nor-
mally since the 1969 crisis. The effectiveness of this institu-
tional structure has led to its implementation in other groups
such as the Maghreb Group, the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and CARICOM.49
The utility of the public international corporation in inte-
gration schemes can be seen not only in the areas of financing
institutions and common services, but also in the more exten-
sive use of the framework and the granting of special privileges
to these enterprises within regional integration schemes. The
European Economic Community has facilitated the growth of
the public international corporation by allowing cumulative
rules of origin. The Latin American Economic System repre-
sents the latest and perhaps most significant attempt to foster
the use of the corporate framework.
In West Africa, use of the corporate device is increasing in
integration schemes. A recent UNIDO advisory report recom-
mended the use of the framework to the Mano River Union,
which has recently been formed between Sierra Leone and Lib-
eria.5 0 As a complement to the initiation of a customs union and
harmonization of investment incentives between the two
states, a public international corporation has been proposed for
46. Treaty for East African Co-operation, Chapter XIX, Corporations within the
Community. R. HAZELWOOD, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 96-
104 (1975).
47. Pomonti, La Communaute de I'Afrique de 'est est menacee d'eclatement, Le
Monde, Oct. 17, 1975, at 6, col. 3. Kiapi, Distributing the Gains from Integration in
East Africa, 7 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 328 (1973).
48. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 98-100.
49. Sidjanski, supra note 34, at 150-51.
50. Mano River Declaration, signed in Malema, Oct. 3, 1973, and Protocols to the
Declaration, signed in Bo, Oct. 3, 1974.
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the production of power from the Mano River. The device can
then, if desired, be employed subsequently for development of
the river's basin and even for telecommunications." Other pub-
lic international corporations have been proposed for certain
research and training boards and for the training of technical
personnel for telecommunications." Some of these devices can
be structured so as to permit participation by other states, such
as members of the recently signed Treaty on the Economic
Community of West African States.53 For instance, a public
international corporation framework has been proposed for the
creation of a regional maritime institute to include students
from Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and includes par-
ticipation by international aid donors. This arrangement is dis-
cussed below in Section IV. 51
A significant recent development in economic integration
has been the establishment of a regional legal framework grant-
ing new regional companies special status and privileges con-
nected with the aims of the integration scheme.5 Although the
EEC has considered enacting uniform company laws,5" and the
Central American States have created a special regime for "in-
tegration industries" prior to the formation of the CACM,57 the
51. Sundstrom, Legislative Measures, Mano River Union I, TS/RAF/74/002, Ter-
minal Report, prepared for the Mano River Union Secretariat, March 31, 1975, Appen-
dix II, Draft Protocol Concerning the Establishment of a Union Training and Research
Board, a Union Training Levy Fund and other Facilities (restricted document).
52. Sundstrom, Legislative Measures, Mano River Union II, IS/RAF/74/092/11-
01/10 Preliminary Report prepared for Mano River Union Secretariat, July 31, 1975
(restricted document).
53. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
signed May 28, 1975, Lagos, Nigeria, -U.N.T.S. _. See also Penouil, Le Traite
de Lagos Efface ta Chivage Entre Pays Francophone et Anglophone, Le Monde Di-
plomatique, Oct. 1975, at 24; and Spotlight on ECOWAS-Historical Evolution,
AFRICA, Dec. 1975, at 45-49.
54. Draft Agreement for the Establishment of a West African Regional Maritime
Institute, undated, Secretariat, Mano River Union, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
55. Pazoc, Regional Integration of Trade among Developing Countries, in TRADE
STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT (P. Streeten ed. 1973); Behrman, International Sectoral
Integration, 6 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 269-72 (1972).
56. Treaty of Rome, art. 149, and Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil portant
Statut de societies anonymes europeennes, BULLETIN DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES,
May 13, 1975.
57. Convenio sobre el Regimen de Industrias Centroamericanos de Integracion,
signed on June 10, 1958, by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica, and the Protocol to this Convention, signed on Jan. 29, 1963, in INSTITUTO INTERA-
MERICANO DE ESTUDION JURIDICOS INTERNACIONALES, INSTRUMENTOS RELATIVOS A LA INTE-
GRACION ECONOMICA LATINA 57 (1964).
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first comprehensive legislation has arisen in the Andean Com-
mon Market. This legislation will facilitate regional transna-
tional corporations and sectoral programming.
According to the Cartagena Agreement establishing the
Andean Common Market, the signatory countries have pledged
themselves to "balanced and harmonious development" and
"acceleration of growth rates."58 In addition to these familiar
objectives, the Andean countries have aimed to facilitate the
participation of their member-states in LAFTA. In addition,
the signatories have agreed to joint programming and coordina-
tion of policies in various fields. Joint industrial and agricul-
tural planning is complemented by coordination of exchange,
financial and fiscal policies, as well as national economic and
social plans. Common treatment of foreign capital is also pro-
vided."'
The adoption of Decision 24 sets forth precise rules for
common treatment of foreign capital, and prohibits the estab-
lishment of foreign companies in some fields, and limits their
establishment in other fields. Decision 24 also restricts trade
liberalization within the regional market to domestic corpora-
tions (containing at least 80 percent local capital participation
or ownership) and mixed or joint corporations (those with at
least 51 percent regional domestic ownership). Foreign corpora-
tions (those with less than 51 percent regional ownership) can-
not participate in this scheme. 0 The recent decision of the
presidents of the national airline companies to create the Asso-
ciation of Andean Airlines (A.A.L.A.) in order to coordinate
their services provides an example of the type of cooperative
projects which are occurring in the Andean Group.' Potential
now exists in economic activities such as petrochemicals for
existing state enterprises to join multinational corporations (as
managers) in commercial endeavors. Other potential economic
areas for such a framework include transport (i.e., airlines,
shipping and railways) and communications.
2
58. For background on economic and public policy, see M. MORAWITZ, THE AN-
DEAN GROUP: A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1974).
59. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 89-90.
60. Id. at 90.
61. Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec. 1975, at 38, col. 2.
62. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 90-91.
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The Lom6 Convention, entered into by the European Eco-
nomic Community and the signatory African, Caribbean and
Pacific states, provides many opportunities for the public in-
ternational corporation mechanism. 3 The Convention departs
from the usual practice of restricting the rules of origin in the
determination of the application of tariffs, and allows the de-
veloping A.C.P. states to combine all of their member countries
in the calculation of the rules of origin for products exported
to the EEC. 4 These provisions facilitate regional integration
and combinations between states and their own corporations as
well as between states and MNCs.15 For instance, two A.C.P.
states in the Caribbean could take raw materials within their
own borders, transport them for processing in a nearby place
such as Puerto Rico (which is a tax haven for manufacturing
and for U.S. corporations)," and then ship finished goods to the
EEC. As long as 51 percent of the value can be attributed to
activities within the Caribbean state, the goods would reach
the European markets with trade preferences." Since the
A.C.P. states have recently engaged in a series of integration
projects among themselves and with adjacent states and
groups (i.e., CARICOM with CACM and Andean Pact and the
West African integration agreements referred to above), the
public international corporation mechanism assumes import-
ance for commercial and development undertakings."
Subsequent to the Lom6 Convention, the EEC has agreed
to follow, as part of its system of generalized preferences for
developing countries, the principle of cumulative rules of origin
for products from states belonging to particular integration
63. Convention of Lom6 Between the European Economic Community and Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, done at Lom6, Togo, Feb. 28, 1975, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 595 (1975) [hereinafter Lom6 Convention].
64. Rules of origin are contained in a protocol which is a part of the Lom6 Con-
vention. See title I, art. 1; see also note 67 infra.
65. Lom6 Convention, title IV, art. 3, and the application of Protocol 2 on Finan-
cial and Technical Cooperation, Chapter 4.
66. Woods, Business Operations in Puerto Rico, TAX MANAGEMENT (FOREIGN
INCOME) 139-2d, A-7-A-13, A-23-A-28 (1972); and Francis, Foreign Corporations Doing
Business in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 26 REV. JR. U.P.R. 347 (1957).
67. Protocol No. 1 Concerning the Definition of the Concept of Originating Prod-
ucts and Methods of Administrative Cooperation, art. 3, describing processing and List
A which itemizes 290 tariff items in which the value added, when specified in percen-
tage terms, is 50 percent.
68. See discussion of SELA in text accompanying notes 83-88, infra.
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schemes: Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
CACM, the Andean Group,69 and the Maghreb Group.70 These
states, who were not signatories of the Lom6 Convention, now
have incentives to accelerate regional integration. The example
of the EEC should be adopted by more developed countries.
Professor Sundstr6m has noted that the public interna-
tional corporation has had considerable success, not available
to the multinational corporation or the state enterprise, in
achieving a type of "limited integration" among nation-
states.7 "Limited integration" means such cooperation as is a
result of a specified project, such as the undertaking of a service
jointly by two or more states (e.g., the Basel-Musel Airport) ,72
the construction and operation of a multinational waterway
(e.g., the International Moselle Company), 3 or the regional
development of natural resources (e.g., the utilization of the
water resources of the Zambezi River in the Kariba Dam pro-
ject-the Central African Power Corporation)." All these ex-
amples illustrate "limited integration" on a geographically
local level. Due to the coordination of national policies neces-
sary to ensure the success of a project, "limited integration"
occurs.75
Concrete examples of limited integration can be set forth.
In the case of the Central African Power Corporation, to make
the Kariba Dam an economic proposition, Rhodesia and Zam-
bia must coordinate their policies on power generation to a
substantial degree.7" In a similar fashion in order to make the
69. Europe Agence International d'Information Pour la Presse, Release, at 8 (Dec.
20, 1975).
70. Europe Agence International d'Information Pour la Presse, Release, at 4 (Dec.
29-30, 1975).
71. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 236; SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 56-80.
72. See description of Basel-Mulhouse Airport in SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 216 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note
13, at 40 et seq.
73. See description of the International Moselle Company in SUNDSTROM, PIUC:
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 145 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 13, at 40 et seq.
74. See descriptions of the Central African Power Corporation in SUNDSTROM,
PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 177 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 13, at 63 et seq.
75. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 238; also SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
76. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239; also SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
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most efficient use of the Moselle Canal, Luxembourg, Germany
and France must coordinate their transport policies.7 In these
two projects integrated decisions are made on issues concerning
all constituent states in the limited subject matter area. Com-
bining this with the concept of the "limited integration effect,"
i.e., the theory that any amount of integration will always re-
sult in a progressive degree of coordination, one logically views
these limited projects as instruments of integration, though
their effect on the total economy and the total political and
legal institutions of the constituent countries may vary. To this
extent, the public international corporation can act as a substi-
tute for the traditional international organizations of a regional
integration scheme.7
When the "limited integration" effect is cumulative, an
acceleration of interaction is achieved. This is noticeable in the
Latin American- Caribbean-Central American region, where
functional interstate cooperation via the corporate device has
been often discussed and attempted. The CACM has a policy
for regional enterprises;"' the Andean Group has a scheme for
sectoral integration through creating special benefits for re-
gional companies;8' the Caribbean Community has as an objec-
tive unspecified functional cooperation in common services and
sixteen designated areas.82 Recent creations of new forms of
institutional cooperation among these groups represent the
''cumulative result" of the "limited effect."
A new integration activity among Caribbean, Latin Ameri-
can and Central American countries portends dynamic
achievements for functional cooperation on a regional scale via
the public corporate device. On October 18, 1975, 23 countries
77. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239; also SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
78. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 69-75.
79. C. FLIGLER, supra note 13, at 4, 12-13.
80. Rosenstein-Rodan, The Consortia Technique, in FOREIGN AID 226 (J. Bhagwati
& R. Eckaus eds. 1970).
81. Bergstedt, supra note 8, passim; Behrman, Governmental Policy Alternatives
and the Problems of Institutional Sharing, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 289-303
(J. Dunning ed. 1970); and Penrose, The State and the Multinational Corporation in
the Less Developed Countries, in id., at 221-40.
82. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 INT'L LEGAL




signed a treaty creating the Latin American Economic System
(SELA).13 SELA will coordinate existing regional integration
mechanisms. (i.e., LAFTA, CACM, CARICOM, and the An-
dean Group), and has a fundamental objective of fostering the
efficient exploitation of regional resources through the creation
and support of multinational Latin American enterprises. The
equity of these enterprises will consist of state and public
shares, all of whose national shares will be guaranteed by the
respective constituent states. 4 The SELA consists of three
major institutions: a Council of Ministers or their designees;
Action Committees; and a Permanent Secretariat. 5 The Coun-
cil exercises political supervision and final authority over im-
portant decisions." The Action Committees which can be cre-
ated either by the Council or merely by interested constituent
States, will last as long as specific projects warrant. Financing
of Action Committees will be by assessments on the participat-
ing States. 7 SELA represents the quintessence of the institu-
tional mechanism with a large potential for coordinating ad hoc
projects on a regional level. The recent announcement of the
formation of NAMUCAR, a Caribbean multinational shipping
company, with a starting capital of $30 million and an initial
capacity of one million tons, is an example of the forms of
integration which are occurring in Latin America."8
Other institutional advances to coordinate integration
schemes in Latin America have occurred recently. On August
25, 1975, an extraordinary meeting of the LAFTA permanent
83. Convenio de Panama Constitutivo del Sistema, Economico Latinamerican
(SELA), based on the agreement reached in the Conference of Panama of July 31-Aug.
2, 1975. Treaty was obtained from the Venezuelan Mission to the European Commis-
sion in Brussels. Labreveus, Vingt-trois pays ont signe a Panama le traite instituant
le systeme economique latino-americain, Le Monde, Oct. 21, 1975, at 2. For back-
ground, see Agor, Latin American Inter-State Politics, INTER-AMER. AFF., Autumn
1972, at 25-26; and Roett, The Changing Nature of Latin American International
Relations: Geopolitical Realities, in THE AMERICAS IN A CHANGING WORLD: A REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 95-111 (1975).
84. Convenio de Panama, Ch. 2, art. 5, 1(a).
85. Id. at Ch. 4, art. 8.
86. Id. at Ch. 4, arts. 9-19.
87. Id. at Ch. 4, arts. 20-26.
88. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information Pour la Presse, Release, at 14
(Dec. 8-9, 1975); also mentioned in Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec. 1975, at 38, col. 3.
For background on attempts by developing countries to alter shipping arrangements,
see Zamora, UNCTAD ll-The Question of Shipping, 7 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 91-99
(1973).
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executive committee accorded Costa Rica, Honduras, Guate-
mala and Nicaragua observer status. Although a coordinating
commission had been formed between CACM and LAFTA in
1967, it has met only once since that date."9
Potential stimulus for increased South-South relations
between the states benefiting from the cumulative rules of ori-
gin and, in the case of the Lom6 Convention substantial inte-
gration assistance, exists even outside regional schemes. An
example is in the sphere of Afro-Caribbean relations. Cultural
communication and transportation ties are likely to be the ini-
tial areas of cooperation. 0 The Festival of Black Arts in Nigeria
has already precipitated the initiation of flights from Lagos to
the Caribbean at reduced rates." A primary aim of increased
Afro-Caribbean relations will be to eliminate middlemen prof-
its of multinational corporations as when a West African nation
buys sugar from the United Kingdom. In this example, the raw
sugar often originates in the West Indies, but is transported by
a multinational shipping company to the U.K., where it is
processed, and then shipped again by a multinational shipping
company to West Africa. 2 With the signing of the Lom6 Con-
vention, the West Indies has an incentive to process raw sugar,
and use its new merchant fleet (NAMUCAR) to ship sugar to
West Africa and Europe. Joint training programs should pro-
mote the acquisition of common skills, such as tourist promo-
tion, training of nautical and customs personnel, and so forth.
Accelerated programs and activities will occur among other
states and regional groups, which can take advantage of the
principle of cumulative rules of origin in trade with the EEC
and other developed countries following this principle.
In assessing the recent developments within and among
integration schemes, the corporate device represents an invalu-
able vehicle to accomplish varied objectives. Although the his-
torical perspective is not developed sufficiently to assess the
overall impact on the international order of the different pro-
89. Le Monde Diplomatique, Oct. 1975, at 26, col. 2.
90. Note, Afro-Caribbean Links, 50 AFRICA OVERSEAS 59 (1975). Also see generally,
Rosenbaum & Tyler, South-South Relations: The Economic and Political Contents of





jects being undertaken, the initial impression is favorable, es-
pecially if the projects' cumulative impact is considered.
IV. AID DISTRIBUTION
The public international corporation can be utilized by
states in coordinating and managing traditional frameworks of
distributing aid; therefore, the corporate mechanism may help
overcome current political, geographical and institutional bar-
riers. 3 Current attempts at coordinating aid distribution will
provide alternatives against which the corporate mechanism
can be measured. New objectives and concrete legal devices for
their implementation will be examined.
Six types of coordination efforts between donors and do-
nees have been identified:
1. coordination of aid by recipient country;
2. coordination through an international finance agency;
3. coordination of aid from several sources to a particular inte-
gration group;
4. coordination of bilateral aid policies in general among several
donors;
5. coordination of aid from several donors for particularly large
projects;
6. coordination of aid on a regional basis by several donors and
several recipients.
These types of aid coordination can be combined. Different
institutional mechanisms can provide the means for coordina-
tion .
Existing political and institutional arrangements impede
international cooperation in aid distribution: donors, such as
states and international institutions, often divide their efforts
by functions, resulting in competition and overlap rather than
cooperation and often without regard to effectiveness of total
aid efforts;95 efforts among recipients are fragmented by na-
tional boundaries which cut across and prevent rational subre-
gional development planning."
93. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 381-82.
94. Hoffman, Aid Coordination, paper presented at the Ditchley Conference on
Improving the Effectiveness of Aid for Overseas Development, at 5, Ditchley Park,
England, June 3, 1966; see also Frank & Baird, Foreign Aid: Its Speckled Past and
Future Prospects, 29 INT'L ORG. 133-68 (1975).
95. P. STREETEN, AID TO AFRICA: POLICY OUTLINE FOR THE 1970s 125 (1972).
96. Id.
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Despite many academic discussions on the necessity to
coordinate aid, donors have largely failed in this endeavor. Bi-
lateral donors have achieved a measure of cooperation among
themselves, but are still in many respects competing with one
another, rather than cooperating in achieving maximum aid
efficiency." Multilateral agencies, such as the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) are designed
not to overcome obstacles in bilateral competition, but rather
for division by function-education, agriculture, health, indus-
tries, etc."
Development can be best accomplished by recognizing
developing societies as social systems. By not isolating indus-
trialization, nutrition, agriculture and education, but by deal-
ing with them as a complex of interrelated problems, policies
could then assume the form of a concerted and appropriately
phased attack on several fronts." In spite of progress towards
an integrated approach to aid, individual and multilateral do-
nors still facilitate fragmentation, separation and autonomy,
with donors stressing the technical aspects of their contribu-
tions instead of the social, cultural, political and economic set-
tings in which these measures are to occur. 00
Fragmentation on the part of the recipients constitutes
another major impediment to effective aid coordination. The
recipients are grouped by historical, political and administra-
tive functions, and not by economic principles. National sepa-
ration has been promoted by the World Bank's requirements
of national development plans, which do not embrace the plans
of other countries.
10
The corporate device can be employed by states and multi-
lateral organizations to coordinate and manage the framework
of distributing and receiving aid. The consortium and consulta-
tive (advisory) groups should be distinguished: in a consor-
97. Id.
98. Id. See also Sewell, Functional Agencies, in THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 480-523 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
99. P. STREETEN, supra note 95, at 126. See also Hoffman, supra note 94, at 22-
28.
100. P. STREETEN, supra note 95, at 126-27. See also Hoffman, supra note 94, at
22-28.
101. P. STREETEN, supra note 95, at 126-27.
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tium, member governments undertake to attend sessions in
which specific pledges are made;'"' in the consultative group,
bilateral aid-only is given, and member states meet to discuss
possibilities for coordination.0 3 New ways of using the corpo-
rate device for coordination of aid now interact with the estab-
lished coordinating mechanisms. Most promising are new ways
to simultaneously coordinate donors and donees.
On the level of multilateral aid the consortia established
under the auspices of the World Bank, as in the Aid India
Consortium and the OECD Consortium for Turkey, provide
useful models. 04 The disappointment of the Aid India Consor-
tium can be attributed not to the structure, but partly to the
failure to include India, the state primarily involved, in the
Consortium, and to the lack of coordination of policies between
the donor states.0 5 More promising has been the World Bank's
attempts to combine several donor countries in advisory groups
for a single or a group of countries, thereby achieving a certain
measure of coordination of aid. 6 Another consultative group
has been the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
OECD, which facilitated discussions and criteria-setting for
aid coordination.0 7 On a regional level the European Develop-
ment Bank offers an example of a body, autonomous of its
Member-states, and under the direction of the Commission of
the European Communities, which distributes aid to the asso-
ciated countries on a non-political basis. The concept is ex-
tended by the Lom6 Convention, which is discussed further
below. 0"
The consultative group technique has been used on the
regional level with varying degrees of success. The Alliance for
Progress in Latin America, the Nordic Cooperation group, and
102. Hoffman, supra note 94, at 9-15.
103. Id.
104. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 379-81. For descrip-
tions of the Aid India Consortium, see W. FRIEDMANN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AID
137-40 (1966); for descriptions of the OECD Consortium for Turkey, see id. at 142. For
a general description of consortia, see J. WHITE, PLEDGED TO DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIA AND THE STRATEGY OF Am (1967).
105. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 104, at 137-42; see also Rosenstein-Rodan, supra
note 80, at 223.
106. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 241.
107. Rosenstein-Rodan, supra note 80, at 225.
108. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
(1973).
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the European Economic Community cooperative efforts merit
attention.
The advisory group technique employed in the Alliance for
Progress in Latin America has served as a model for years. The
Committee of Nine, an impartial and objective body composed
of members from the constituent States, performs the service
of evaluating development programs of applying nations and
making recommendations. The Inter-America Committee on
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) acts as a consulting and coor-
dinating agency, which acts upon the recommendations of the
Committee of Nine both with the contributing and the devel-
oping countries. The CIAP coordinates its relations not only
with contributing countries in the Alliance for Progress, but
also with other countries and international aid and distributing
organizations. 9
The Nordic countries have employed both consortia and
consultative groups in order to coordinate assistance from all
sources to countries of primary interest in their bilateral pro-
grams."10 By virtue of an agreement, signed in 1968, Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden have combined resources for fi-
nancing several technical assistance projects in Africa. The
projects are administered by a Nordic intergovernmental board
which in turn usually delegates the administration to one of the
Nordic national aid administrations.'
In the European Economic Community, the Community
Council has been meeting to try to coordinate aid efforts for
situations not covered under their associated agreements' ar-
rangement (see statements above concerning the European
Development Fund). Recently, a debate has concerned issues
such as aid to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which are not
associated members, but still have close ties to the U.K., an
109. Rosenstein-Rodan, supra note 80, at 227; 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 33-
34; Hoffman, supra note 94, at 24; see also comments on the use of a consortium to
facilitate university institutions to assist in research and operational programs in de-
veloping countries in R. POATS, TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS 241 (1972).
110. Westring, Swedish Aid to Developing Countries, 4 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 271
(1970).
111. Agreement between Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway concerning the




EEC member."' Other important issues have included: policy
positions and representation in the North-South dialogue in
Paris in December 1975; the Commission's request for funds so
that it can collaborate with non-governmental bodies in pro-
viding aid to the Third World; participation in the Interna-
tional Agricultural Development Fund (IDAF); and overall
coordination of national aid programs."3
Three main schools of thought have arisen in the EEC
concerning coordination of national aid programs. The first
school of thought is that a specific program should be adopted.
The second school of thought is that the current approach
should be continued: discussions should be held, and coordina-
tion should occur according to circumstances, i.e., aid to Portu-
gal, food aid, special emergency aid (the Cheysson Fund), and
aid to Palestine refugees. The third and intermediate approach
is that the Community should periodically (i.e., annually) allo-
cate a ceiling for non-contractual aid, and then allocate the
funds according to established criteria, which would not men-
tion exactly the recipients or the means of aid."4 The overall
approach to aid in the EEC will not be resolved for some time.
However, the common discussions have forged many common
programs towards aid."'
The flexibility of the public international corporate device
in coordinating aid by recipients can be seen in a recent inter-
national agreement establishing the West Africa Maritime In-
stitute (WAMI), and entered into by Gambia, Ghana, Liberia
and Sierra Leone. The institute provides for expansion of the
Ghana Nautical College."' This institute is run by a director
with the assistance of a Technical Committee, and under the
policy guidance of a Council of Regents. "7 In order to maintain
112. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information, Release at 10 (Oct. 9, 1975); at
4 (Oct. 15, 1975).
113. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information, Release at 10 (Oct. 9, 1975); at
4 (Oct. 15, 1975).
114. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information, Release at 10 (Oct. 9, 1975).
115. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE COMMUNITIES' CONTRIBU-
TION TO THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1975); COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcrIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 226-44 (1975); 2 BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 50-52 (1975).
116. Secretariat, Mano River Union, Draft Agreement for the Establishment of a
West Africa Maritime Institute (undated).
117. Id.
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aid from international sources, and enable them to effectively
participate in decision-making, the international aid agencies
may have associate, non-voting membership in the Council of
Regents."'
The use of the corporate device to give multilateral aid on
a regional level can be illustrated by analyzing the Venezuela
Trust Fund (Fondo de Inversiones). The grantor of the trust is
Venezuela and the trustee is the Inter-American Development
Bank. On February 27, 1975, a trust agreement set forth the
terms of the aid arrangement." 9
The funds of the trust are to be used to finance programs
or projects which have a significant effect on the development
of those member countries of the Bank which are relatively less
developed or of limited market size or of intermediate size.' 20
The funds are to be used specifically to promote better use of
the natural resources and of the industry and agro-industry of
the beneficiary countries.'"' Financing includes equity financ-
ing in the form of share subscriptions or bond purchases. 22
In the administration of the fund, the trustee must use the
criteria of security and profitability of its investments.'23 Fi-
nancing activities of private corporations are limited to those
corporations in which at least 80 percent of the ownership
comes from the developing countries of the region who are
members of the Bank.'
24
The impact of this regional multilateral aid is reflected in
the initial investments of the funds, such as the recent agree-
ment to finance $10 million of debt obligations of the CACM.' 25
This type of aid illustrates the use of a corporate mechanism
to cooperate in aid distribution, both on the part of the donors
and the donees.
The recently signed Lom6 Convention provides a concrete
118. Id.
119. Trust Agreement between the Venezuelan Investment Fund and the Inter-
American Development Bank, done at Washington, D.C., Feb. 27, 1975.14 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 316 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Trust Agreement].
120. Trust Agreement, art. I, § 2.
121. Id.
122. Trust Agreement, art. II, § 3.
123. Trust Agreement, art. IV, § 10(a).
124. Trust Agreement, art. IV, § 11.
125. Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec. 1975, at 38, col. 2.
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example of how many of the principles of coordinating aid can
be facilitated within a legal framework. The aid provided for
in the Lom6 Convention gives the recipient A.C.P. countries
the right to participate in the selection of management and
execution of projects and programs.126 In addition, eligible re-
cipients are not limited only to individual countries, local au-
thorities, and public or semi-public development agencies, but
include regional interstate bodies to which A.C.P. states be-
long.'27 Projects eligible for aid may involve developed coun-
tries other than the A.C.P. states.' 21 Specific mention is made
of assistance which will promote regional and interregional eco-
nomic integration. Provision is made for aid projects to con-
sider, where feasible, operation with other A.C.P. states.'
29
Of paramount importance, the Lom6 Convention repre-
sents a step towards further integration of relations between
North and South. Hence, the Convention deals with trade is-
sues, not as separate items, but as integrated into a complex
system of cooperation, covering several fields, including eco-
nomic and technical assistance, transfer of technology, pay-
ments arrangements and the creation of a link between the
plans and programs of developing and developed countries so
as to lend assurance on both sides. The attempt at a more
comprehensive linkage in international relations can also be
seen in the decision, taken in the second meeting between the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
the oil consuming nations to include not only energy, but also
raw materials, development and financial affairs in the sub-
stantive negotiations.' 0
In designing aid policies, the consortia and consultative
(advisory) group techniques, use of a corporate framework to
combine donors and donees, the trust mechanism, and the
comprehensive approach of the Lom6 Convention provide good
examples combining donors and recipients within frameworks
which transcend both national and unifunctional categories.
126. Convention of Lom, title IV, art. 50.
127. Convention of Lom , title IV, art. 49.
128. Convention of Lom, title IV, art. 56.
129. Convention of Lom , title IV, art. 50.
130. Final Declaration on the Preparatory Meeting of the Conference on Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation and Annexed Documents, Europe Agence Internationale
D'Information (Special Release No. 866, Oct. 20, 1975).
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These legal instruments and principles offer nations and inter-
national organizations many new concrete possibilities for co-
ordinating aid effectively.
V. SOME PROJECTIONS
The public international corporation framework can be
used advantageously in some new areas where relations among
principal international actors are still fluid. Although aca-
demic ordering of these areas is arbitrary, especially in view of
the trend of nations to perceive relations more comprehen-
sively, four principal areas are set forth: natural resource and
development programs; new commercial endeavors with politi-
cal implications; dealing with multinational corporations; and
the evolution of the multinational corporation.
A. Natural Resource and Development Programs
An area in which the corporate device can be effectively
implemented is development programs or projects in which
high capital costs are a major factor. This area embraces rela-
tionships which fall within traditional development of natural
resources which lie in a region, but transcend state boundaries.
More recently, such programs and projects focus on critical
sectors such as energy development or ocean resource develop-
ment. A separate section is provided for this discussion since
the programs and projects being devised or pondered transcend
normal integration schemes. Although this discussion will
focus primarily on river basin development in the troubled
Sahel area of Africa, many other examples could be used.
Prerequisites of national and regional development now
make interstate cooperation imperative throughout the world
and especially the developing countries. National boundaries
often do not coincide with natural resources.13' Many develop-
ment programs require assistance from international sources;
technical assistance and international funding may both be
most easily secured through pooling. 131 Interstate cooperation is
also often essential for combining markets and in establishing
infrastructure improvements, both of which are prerequisites
for development schemes. For instance, power and river basin
development, railways, canals and various transport works
131. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 21-25; C. FLIGLER,
supra note 13, at 1.
132. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 21-25.
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often transcend national boundaries.'33 Since traditional inter-
governmental organizations can no longer provide the required
efficiency and flexibility, and since multinational corporations
cannot always be allowed for various economic, ideological and
political reasons to reap the profits of such projects, new means
must be found to execute these vital projects. The amount of
capital required and the low profitability of these projects often
make assumption of them by some, especially small govern-
ments, impossible. 
3
River basin development is an area in which the corporate
device has been essential in promoting interstate cooperation.
International agreements establishing a corporate mechanism
of river basin development have involved the Lower Mekong,
La Plata, the Niger, the Senegal, and the Chad.' 35 The corpo-
rate device has been used to provide a permanent body with
technical capability, access to international aid, the capability
of coordinated and sometimes quick action. This is an accepta-
ble way to limit sovereignty.' 6
Important examples of river basin development are found
in the Sahel region of West Africa. In this zone between the
Sahara Desert and the River Niger, a severe, protracted
drought has caused calorie insufficiency and starvation to be-
come constant problems, affecting at least one-third of the re-
gion's population.' 37 Several corporate devices for river basin
development-the Organization for the Development of the
Senegal River (Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal-OMVS),
the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Niger River Commis-
sion, and the Permanent Drought Control Committee for the




The OMVS, of which Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal are
members, was created in 1972, along with a Convention con-
133. C. FLIGLER, supra note 13, at 5; Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFMcAN L., at 234.
134. Id.
135. Menon, Water Resource Development of International Rivers with Special
Reference to the Developing World, 9 INT'L LAW. 441, 456 (1975).
136. See Legal Aspects of Hydroelectric Development of Rivers and Lakes of
Common Interest, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136, at 181-92, 251-61 (1952).
137. Dow, Famine in the Sahel: A Dilemma for United States Aid, 68 CURRENT
HISTORY 197-98 (1975).
138. Id. at 201.
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cerning the Senegal River. The essential aims of the OMVS are
as follows: (1) to promote cooperation and the economic devel-
opment of the river basin and its resources; and (2) to support
the efforts of the Member-states in accomplishing the objec-
tives of the adjoining Convention.'39
The structure of the OMVS gives it organizational flexibil-
ity. The Conference of the Heads of State is the chief organ,
making decisions on general political matters of importance
with unanimity required for action. The Council of Ministers,
which meets once a year, sets forth priorities with regard to the
management of the basin and development of resources as well
as establishing the budget. The most important organ of the
OMVS is the executive-the Secretariat. The Secretary-
General directs the Secretariat, and is appointed by the Heads
of State for a three year term. The Secretariat encompasses a
Technical Branch including Energy, Transport, Agriculture,
Hydroagricultural Programs, Financial and Administrative
Services, and a Documentation Center. 4 " Each of these divi-
sions is engaged in a series of short- and long-term programs.'
The Lake Chad River Basin, consisting of the four riparian
states of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, was formed in
May 1964. Its objectives are to intensify Member-states' coop-
erative efforts in the economic development of the river basin,
especially surface and ground water utilization, agriculture,
livestock, minerals, industry, transportation and telecommuni-
cations development.
4 2
The Commission is composed of two Commissioners from
each state and, along with five permanent subcommissions,
meets twice annually in plenary sessions. The Secretariat is
directed by an Executive Secretary who is appointed for three
years, subject to extension. He is assisted by a small adminis-
trative and technical staff (10 in 1972), a number of foreign
technical experts, and miscellaneous other local personnel.,
The Secretary-General coordinates the work of the Sub-
139. Amar, L'Organisation Pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal, 16 J. OF
AF-ICAN L. 299 (1972).
140. Id. at 300.
141. Id. at 301-02.




commissions and regional infrastructure projects, such as tele-
communications, road building, bridge construction, tsetse fly
eradication, livestock development, and an agricultural experi-
mental station.
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The Niger River Commission created by Nigeria, Niger
and Mali provides another example of the use of a corporate
organism for river basin development. Its objectives are to
maintain liaison between the riparian states for the most effec-
tive use of the basin resources; to conduct studies and recom-
mend to the Member-states joint projects for utilization of the
basin; and to examine complaints and settle disputes.
4
1
The organization of the Commission is unique. The high-
est organ consists of nine Commissioners, one from each ri-
parian state, but not necessarily the Heads of State or even
Ministers. They meet once a year, and decision-making is by
two-thirds vote of a quorum.'"6 The executive, called the Ad-
ministrative Secretary, is appointed by the Commission for a
term of three years. His duties are determined by the Commis-
sion. 47 Since the Administrative Secretary's duties, term, and
even staff are substantially constrained by the Commission,
the authority required by the executive of a public interna-
tional corporation is circumscribed, and the autonomy of the
organism is thus limited.
As a result of the severe drought in the Sahel in 1973,
another corporate device was formed. On September 12, 1973,
the states of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and
Upper Volta entered into a Convention establishing a Perma-
nent Interstate Drought Control Committee for the Sahel
(CILSS).'4 Its functions are to coordinate all action to combat
the drought by seeking financial and technical assistance for
Member-states. '4
144. Id. at 344.
145. Agreement Concerning the River Niger Commission and Navigation and
Transport on the Niger River, done at Niamey, Niger, Nov. 25, 1964, art. 2, 287
U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter cited as Niger River Agreement].
146. Niger River Agreement, arts. 3-5.
147. Niger River Agreement, arts. 6-9.
148. Convention Establishing a Permanent Inter-State Drought Control Commit-
tee for the Sahel among Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta,
done at Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, Sept. 12, 1973. 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 537 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Sahel Convention].
149. Sahel Convention, art. 4.
1976
70 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
The organizational structure consists of a Conference of
the Heads of State and another of the Council of Ministers.
50
However, broad power is endowed upon an executive, known
as the Regional Coordinator, who is appointed by the Council
for two years.'' The Regional Coordinator is assisted by a
Technical Secretariat and a staff,'5 2 and is to take all steps
required to fulfill the aims of the Convention.'53 The Commit-
tee may be joined by any African state whose economy is di-
rectly affected by Sahelian conditions.'5 '
The survival of the Sahel region depends on the success of
these and similar mechanisms. Recognition of this fact has led
the various African states to limit their sovereignty to the ex-
tent neceesary to promote cooperative projects.' 5 This is re-
flected in the relative autonomy of the executive in areas such
as river basin management. Through use of a corporate mecha-
nism, in which the Heads of State retain only major political
decision-making, and the executive possesses substantial
power and is charged with coordinating the work of functional
subdivisions or committees, efficiency, technical skills and
continuity can be achieved.
In addition to the river basin projects in the Sahel, other
new natural resource projects will require enormous pooling of
resources, which neither private enterprise nor individual gov-
ernments can afford to make alone. Long-range development
of energy sources is an example of such a program. To be able
to meet their goals, even the industrialized nations are pooling
their financial resources and have proposed, within the Inter-
national Energy Association, the creation of a corporation to
make the requisite investment expenditures.' 56 Recent business
forecasts warn that many high risk, but socially important,
projects will entail investment expenditure so large that only
national governments or interstate schemes will be capable of
150. Sahel Convention, art. 3.
151. Sahel Convention, art. 5.
152. Sahel Convention, art. 8.
153. Sahel Convention, art. 6.
154. Sahel Convention, art. 13.
155. Sohn, The Organization of Economic Co-operation in Africa, 16 J. OF AFRICAN
L. 215, 218 (1972).




financing and executing such projects.'57 Cooperation in this
field can be achieved efficiently through a corporate device
which facilitates public and private participation.
B. New Commercial Endeavors with Political Implications
Commercial opportunities are arising in the international
arena which have important international political implica-
tions. The success of OPEC is attributed partly to the political
will of the Arab countries. Although decision-making in the
operation of the cartel itself is too important to surrender au-
thority to a public international corporation, the latter can be
effective in investing oil profits. Such an institution might also
provide a method by which OPEC can participate in the Third
Window of the World Bank. Another area for potential use of
the corporate mechanism concerns the exploitation of non-
ferrous nodules in the ocean seabed in the continued absence
of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty.
The issue of reinvesting oil profits-"recycling petrodol-
lars"-has assumed international importance. Use of the pub-
lic international corporation mechanism can enable OPEC
countries to employ mutual funds or investment trusts to chan-
nel oil profits into economically sound projects while retaining
their political and negotiating strength. Establishment of spe-
cial funds or banks for the financing of development projects
which are not necessarily connected with the increased cost of
oil has been employed as a substitute for the proposed all-
OPEC development fund.' Such investment mechanisms can
also accomodate other cartels as well.'
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The likely structure of such funds or trusts and their oper-
ations will be described. (These ideas have been set forth, with
emphasis on the political context, in an article by Khodadad
Farmanfarmaian and others in Foreign Affairs in 1975.110) As
is normal in public international corporations, participating
states will be represented on a supervisory board by Ministers
157. L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 263-69 (1972).
158. Williams, The Aid Programs of the OPEC Countries, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308,
315 (1976).
159. See, e.g., R. GARDNER, A TURNING POINT IN NoaTH-SouTH ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (1975); and R. GARDNER, OPEC, THE TRILATERAL WORLD, AND THE DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: NEw ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION, 1976-1980 at 9-16 (1975).
160. Farmanfarmaian, Gutowski, Ohita, Roosa, & Wilson, How Can the World
Afford OPEC Oil?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 201 (1975).
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or designated representatives who will provide the necessary
political supervision of such mutual funds or trusts. Any mu-
tual funds or trusts that may be created would be autonomous
juridical persons with a board of directors responsible for all
operational decisions. The decision to commit new funds and
certain other specific decisions of importance would be made
by the Member-states through the supervisory board. The
directors would be selected by the Member-states on the basis
of their investment management abilities. A manager would be
responsible for daily management of the funds subject to direc-
tives of the board of directors. The expertise of international
investment firms and trust managers of the highest compe-
tence and integrity could be employed if the board were al-
lowed (with the possibility of veto by the supervisory author-
ity), to select such firms to act as technical advisors to the
manager or by making them directors."'
The funds and trusts could channel investments into a
variety of areas. Diversification of investment among firms,
industries and countries would provide safeguards to OPEC
investors that their equity and earnings would be maintained.
To raise more capital, the funds and trusts could allow differ-
ent types of private participation. " The chief advantages
accruing from the trust or fund approach via a corporate man-
agement device is that it would serve as a buffer between inves-
tor and direct foreign holdings of stock. Moreover, the funds or
trusts would be able to utilize the best international manage-
ment acting on non-political, economic criteria." 3 The pooling
of capital and the public nature of the corporate structure
would enhance the negotiating strength of the funds."4
A dynamic stability in the funds could be achieved within
the public corporate model in a number of ways. For diversifi-
cation, percentage limits within the total of a specific trust or
fund might be set for holdings in a given country, currency area
or individual company. Several trusts or funds could be created
for different objectives, such as capital or income. Individual
trusts could be open-end or closed-end. Shares of any trust
161. Id. at 218-22.
162. Id. at 219.
163. Id. at 221.
164. Id. at 219-20.
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could be limited to a relatively small number of countries while
other trusts could be partly open to outside participation. To
ensure repatriation of earnings, trust shares would be made
redeemable according to terms connected to the kinds of assets
held by a particular trust. Guarantees against nationalization
and tax benefits could be negotiated on a project-by-project
basis. Minimization of the consequences of changing rates of
foreign exchange would be realized both through diversification
and through specific guidelines set forth in the trust agree-
ment.'
6 5
By channeling petrodollars into funds and trusts in the
framework of the public international corporate device de-
scribed above, OPEC countries can solidify their economic and
political strength. Recent discussions on cooperation between
the OPEC and the "Trilateral Countries" (U.S., Japan, and
the EEC) in order to recycle petrodollars has focused on the
creation of a "Third Window" in the World Bank to borrow
money from OPEC countries, and lend it to low-income coun-
tries at subsidized interest rates. Although an initial barrier
was the low proportion of representation of OPEC in the cur-
rent structure of the World Bank, an agreeable compromise has
been put forth by the Shah of Iran. He has proposed the estab-
lishment of a special fund associated with, but autonomous
from, the World Bank, with a tripartite directorate, and the
administration and lending activities performed by a profes-
sional staff. This ad hoc, functional approach provides an alter-
native to proceeding through established international law
channels. '
As the Third Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva and
New York has so far failed to produce a treaty, individual coun-
tries are increasingly discussing and taking unilateral and mul-
tilateral action.' 7 In this regard, a multilateral agreement
165. Id. at 219-22.
166. R. GARDNER, OPEC, THE TRILATERAL WORLD, AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION, 1976-1980 at 19-20 (1975). But see Erb,
Petrodollars and Multilateral Development Financing, in THE U.S. AND WORLD DEVEL-
OPMENT: AGENDA FOR ACTION 1975 at 112-113 (J. Howe ed. 1975).
167. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: the 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session,
69 AM J. INT'L L. 763 (1975). For United States threat to unilaterally pursue deep-sea
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among the industrialized nations to mine the ferro-manganese
deposits on the ocean floor is a real possibility. Such a plan
may involve, for instance, Japan, the United States, the EEC
and the Soviet Union.' The structure of such cooperation
would best be executed via a supervisory authority of partici-
pating states, a board of directors charged with awarding con-
tracts and investing profits, and a director, assisted by techni-
cal groups for implementation. A large proportion of the profits
could be channeled into aid institutions and projects as the
four above-mentioned powers have already agreed at the ses-
sion of the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva. Although
such a scheme would be inferior to a universal solution (i.e., a
U.N. sponsored convention), it would be better than unilateral
action for which pressure is currently being exerted." 9
The potential for interaction between major international
blocs increases when corporate and similar devices insulate
decisions from political considerations. A look at some poten-
tial combinations in the areas of energy and ocean mining will
serve as illustration. As discussions of cooperation increase
among these four groups in solving energy problems, the poten-
tial increases for the employment of profits from mining man-
ganese deposits for development of long-term energy sources.
And with the commercial application of some new energy
sources twenty years away, even OPEC could wisely invest
some profits of a trust scheme in energy investments in indus-
trialized countries, since the maturation of new sources is ex-
pected to coincide with the depletion of oil as a primary energy
source.7 0
C. Dealing with Multinational Corporations
A vital and much discussed contemporary problem has
been the inability of national or world organizations to satisfac-
mining, see speech by Secretary of State Kissinger in 122 CONG. REC. 5223, 5225 (daily
ed. Apr. 8, 1975).
168. Knight, Alternatives to a Law of the Sea Treaty, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S.
INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES (R. Amacher & R. Sweeney eds. 1976).
169. For example, Deepsea Ventures Inc.-a consortium of Belgian, Japanese and
American companies-filed a claim of exclusive rights of exploitation in a 60,000
square kilometer area in the northeast Pacific with the United States Department of
State, in Nov. 1974. 10 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 10 (1975).
170. The Ford Administration has reportedly requested the Saudi Arabian gov-
ernment to invest up to $1 billion in U.S. electric utilities. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1976,
at 24, col. 1.
VOL. 6:43
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
torily control the enormous power and activities of the multina-
tional corporation.'7 ' States have increased their regulations
and/or incentives to simultaneously attract and control the
MNC.'72 The increased role of the states in their relations with
the MNC coincides with the Widespread assumption of respon-
sibility by states in the national economy. 73 Until international
law can deal comprehensively with the problem of MNCs, the
public international corporation can promote better interac-
tion because two or more nation-states can combine their re-
sources to regulate the MNC. A sketch of current trends be-
tween MNCs and host countries serves as background.
In dealing with the MNC, states have identified four broad
categories of productive factors and functions which are
thought to be desirable contributions to the host country: (1)
capital formation, especially risk capital required for explora-
tion of natural resources, creating necessary infrastructure,
etc.; (2) technical skills possessed by a multinational firm with
long experience; (3) managerial ability, including the accumu-
lated experience of the multinational firm; and (4) marketing
skills and arrangements, including those arising from inte-
grated operations contracts with consumers.'
States, in dealing with and effectively controlling the
MNC, have separated ownership and management, with the
state assuming immediate partial or total ownership.' For
purposes of our discussion, state participation in the multina-
tional corporate venture will be separated into two catego-
ries-joint ventures and management contracts-although the
concepts are not always distinguishable.' 6
171. Comprehensive treatment of this subject is found in Multinational Corpora-
tions in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY
AT BAY (1971); and other works in the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project.
172. Bergstedt, supra note 8, passim; Bergstedt, Keohane, & Nye, International
Economics and International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 29 INT'L ORG. 3
(1975).
173. Id.
174. Mikesell, The Contribution of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to Eco-
nomic Development, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RE-
SOURCES INDUSTRY 3, 26 (R. Mikesell ed. 1973); see also J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at
68-77; and R. VERNON, supra note 171, at 151-88.
175. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 436-38; J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 92-102; and
R. VERNON, supra note 171, at 151-88.
176. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 436.
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The joint venture is advantageous to the host country in
satisfying the nationalistic, ideological demands of a develop-
ing country as well as increasing the share of the government
in resource revenues. Since many host governments currently
impose diverse controls such as export, price and other market-
ing controls over foreign-owned enterprises, the increased de
jure control afforded by joint ventures may not change substan-
tially the degree of de facto control by the government.'77
In situations where the host government wants to assume
full ownership but cannot yet perform complex technical tasks,
such as management and marketing, the trend has been to
execute service or management contracts, whereby the multi-
national corporation agrees to perform specified services.,7
The compensation received by MNCs for their services range
from straight payments to fees representing a percentage of
profits. Since the assumption of risk together with the re-
sponsibility for marketing the products often remain a part of
the services contract for natural resource development, the
contracts do not substantially alter what were formally called
concessions contracts."'
Unless the host government can provide requisite techni-
cal skills, the joint venture, in which the risk and marketing
function is either shared or taken primarily by the multina-
tional firm, stands out as the preferable scheme for the host
government. Assuming that the multinational firm is usually
more efficient as risk-taker, producer and marketer than is the
host country, the host country can maximize its objectives by
refraining from assuming those functions, at least until it de-
velops the requisite capabilities. 0
Regardless of whether the joint venture or service-
management contract is chosen as the method to combine a
MNC with a host country, the public international corporation
provides a means to combine the participation of two or more
177. Id. at 437; J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 92-102; R. VERNON, supra note 171,
at 140-44.
178. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 437; J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 94-98.
179. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 438.
180. Id. See also Drucker, Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and
Realities, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 121 (1974). Governments are more likely to take complete
ownership of service sectors while industrial and especially extractive sectors necessi-
tate a transitional learning period. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 94-95.
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states with MNCs. Either a private or public firm can serve
effectively as general manager of a large venture in the frame-
work of a public international corporation.
An example of a national public corporation serving as
general manager is provided by the Interim Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Committee (INTELSAT), which is controlled
by a committee made up of the various interested governments
who are simultaneously shareholders in the enterprise and one
General Manager. In this case the General Manager is the
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), which is a
private corporation with public participation, and partial pub-
lic control through publicly appointed directors of the board.''
Many examples exist where a private company serves as
the General Manager. For instance, the Liberian-American-
Swedish Mining Company (LAMCO), which extracts iron ore
in Liberia, uses the mechanism. LAMCO has, as its constitu-
ents, a group of international steel industry interests including
Bethlehem Steel Company of the United States and a major
mining concern in Sweden. Financing is provided by German
and United States banks. The General Manager in this group
is the Swedish Grangesberg Corporation, which is at the same
time a major shareholder of the enterprise. 182
Although the structure is similar in the two examples, the
participation in the first example is largely public while in the
latter it is 50 percent private and 50 percent by the Liberian
Government. The ownership by the Liberian Government
amounts to only a revenue and safeguard device. The Liberian
Government receives dividends on its shares in lieu of taxing
the enterprise. However, the ownership of shares by the Gov-
ernment, combined with diversified private ownership, inhibits
the Government from nationalizing the corporation, or taking
action to reduce the value of its holdings in the company.183
181. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 311-37.
182. R. STORETrE, THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATED SOCIAL INVESTMENT (1971) sets forth
the historical and structural data for the LAMCO operation. See also T. CARDLUND,
LAMCO IN LIBERIA (1969).
183. Sundstrom, Comparative Law in the Development of the Law of Interna-
tional Corporations, 24 ACrA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS JURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATiVAE 238-
39 (1972). For criticism of this arrangement due to negative aspects for Liberia, see
Smith & Wells, Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: Structures and
Substances, 69 AM J. INT'L L. 560, 574 (1975).
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Other arrangements, such as government ownership as a sup-
plement to, and not in lieu of, taxation, are possible." 4
Variations are also possible in the ownership structure of
the corporate body. If ownership is based on the possession of
shares, as is usual, the shares may be held by governments only
or by governments and non-governmental interests in varying
proportions. Arrangements can differ in the constituent states
according to whether the activity pursued by the public inter-
national corporation is domestically entrusted to the private or
the public sector.'85 A possible arrangement would be to have
as shareholders not only governments of the constituent mem-
bers and of public enterprises, but also of public, mixed
private-public, and private corporations, as is the case with
Eurochemic. 188 Another alternative is the ownership of the pub-
lic international corporation by a holding company, as is the
case of the Scandanavian Airlines System, or directly by its
shareholders, as is usually the case." 7
The clearest advantage of a joint venture or a management
contract within the framework of a public international corpo-
ration is that it furnishes an institutional basis for the exercise
of governmental control over the corporation. The difficulty
and time consumed in dealing with a plethora of ministries and
commissions and in obtaining prompt favorable decisions on
export policies necessary to adapt to changes in world competi-
tion can be reduced greatly if the government member of the
board of directors or shareholders of a public international cor-
poration also represent the principal ministries of government
concerned with resource policies. 18 1
D. The Evolution of the Multinational Corporation
In predicting the evolution of the MNC, there seems to be
a growing consensus on the structure of new forms. The princi-
pal theory can be described as the geocentric imperative. With
Howard Perlmutter as its principal proponent, the geocentric
imperative views the multinational corporation as evolving in
stages from its current policy of ethnocentrism to polycentr-
184. Id. at 575.
185. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239-40.
186. W. FRIEDMANN, GOVERNMENTAL (PUBLIC) ENTERPRISE, supra note 4, at 26.
187. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239-40.
188. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 437.
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ism.' s5 The importance of this theory, which will be related in
this section, is that new roles and interactions are forecast in
the international arena. As MNCs, states, and international
organizations struggle against one another on a number of
fronts, the public international corporation mechanism offers
one of many different frameworks in which actors can come
together in the international arena.
Perlmutter describes a three-decade view of a global in-
dustrial system. His theory can be best set forth as follows:
1. Stage One (the 1970s) is a time in which the principal identifi-
cation of the MNC is home country-oriented, or "ethnocentric."
During this decade the public policy milieu of the MNC will vary
widely from ethnocentric-protectionist to geocentric-laissez-
faire.1 0
2. Stage Two (the 1980s) is a time when the mounting pressure
of restrictive legislation by host countries will gradually lead to
disintegration of fully-owned subsidiaries, which will be replaced
by joint ventures, co-production agreements and service con-
tracts.'' In this decade binational and trinational MNCs and
rising state and interstate enterprises in developing and socialist
countries (including transideological enterprises) will take form
("polycentrism"). Public policies are likely to range from
regiocentric-protectionist (i.e., current Andean Code on Foreign
Investment) to geocentric-laissez-faire.1'
2
3. Stage Three (the 1990s) is a time in which many institutions
have found that they must be more "geocentric" than regiocen-
tric or ethnocentric.1 1 3 Hence, the MNC will become an organiza-
tion without any specific country-orientation.'"I The MNCs will
be regulated by various kinds of intergovernmental and global
institutions."' During this era the most successful firms will be
the super-giants or megafirms and the little fishes. Super-giants
will be the huge companies that will be the great manufacturers
worldwide. The little fishes will be some firms (including transi-
189. See Perlmutter, Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, 5 COL.
J. WORLD Bus. 160 (1969).
190. Perlmutter, A View of the Future, in TE NEW SOVEREIGN: A VIEW OF THE
FUTURE 168 (A. Said & L. Simmons eds. 1975).
191. Venn, The Multinationals and Developing Societies: A Profile of the Future,
6 F TUREs 133, 137-38 (1974). See also the discussion and table of possible ownership-
control arrangements in Behrman, Taxation of Extractive Industries in Latin America
and the Impact of Foreign Investors, in R. MIKESELL, supra note 174, at 73-74.
192. Perlmutter, supra note 189, at 168.
193. Id. at 169-70.
194. R. VERNON, supra note 171, at 260-72.
195. Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190
at 80-95 (1973).
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deological firms from developing states, regional and socialist
owned enterprises) who will possess the advantages of specializa-
tion, fast decision-making, and adaptability because of their size
and closeness to customer needs."'
The significance of the Perlmutter theory is found primar-
ily in the vast new combinations which are forecast among
international legal persons. In the not too distant future the
existence of the "genuinely international company," which the
late Professor Wolfgang Friedmann has discussed, will be com-
mon. 197 As socialist and developing state enterprises accelerate
their entrances into the multinational sphere, the use of the
public international corporation becomes instrumental. The
beginning of this can be seen, for example, in the recent an-
nouncement of a plan to combine Brazilian iron ore with Ger-
man know-how and Japanese financing to serve Egyptian
needs through shipping iron ore from Brazil to a sponge-iron
plant in Alexandria, which is jointly owned by Brazil's Com-
panhia Vale do Rio Doce (CRDV), West Germany's Korf In-
dustries and Handel, Japan's C. Itoh, and Egypt's state-owned
General Organization for Industry. Interestingly enough, the
project marks the first time that the Brazilian-owned com-
pany, the world's newest mining giant, has taken a multina-
tional role.'98 As states necessarily enter into ownership or en-
terprises to accomplish the accelerating responsibilities to their
citizens, the existence of the public international corporation
as a framework will become indispensable.
In the end, international law and geocentric organizations
such as the United Nations are the only capable devices to
order and regulate the changing combinations between corpo-
rations and states.'99 Meanwhile, the corporate body, whether
public or private, can be brought into harmony with nation-
states. To achieve their beneficial use as a form of extra-
governmental force internationally and nationally the private
and public corporations must be brought together, not only
196. Perlmutter, supra note 188; see also L. TURNER, supra note 157, at 263.
197. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-84
(1964).
198. BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 3, 1975, at 30.
199. Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190
at 80-95 (1973).
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functionally and operationally, but also administratively.200
Until international legislation to effectively control the MNC
is enacted, the principal actors in the international arena,
namely the nation-state and the MNC, can reap dividends by
using flexible devices in the context of the public international
corporation to steer themselves through the maze of imperman-
ence in today's international economic order.
200. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 385.

